about
I'm a philosopher at HKU with interests in AI, decision theory, epistemology, ethics, and the philosophy of cognitive science.
Much of my research concerns reasoning under disagreement and uncertainty. Specifically, I ask how the judgments of many people, or many models, should be pooled into a single view, and what pragmatic commitments that view carries.
Before joining HKU, I held postdoctoral positions at The Alan Turing Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Jagiellonian University, and the University of Paris.
research
Book
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2025
Opinion Pooling
Cambridge University Press · with Richard Pettigrew
Articles
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forthcoming
Fair group opinions are imprecise
Episteme
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forthcoming
Diving into fair pools: algorithmic fairness, ensemble forecasting, and the wisdom of crowds
Analysis · with Rush Stewart
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2024
Normative uncertainty meets voting theory
Synthese 203, 191–205
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2023
The precautionary principle and expert disagreement
Erkenntnis 88, 2717–2726
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2022
Too rational: how predictive coding's success risks harming the mentally disordered and ill
Journal of NeuroPhilosophy 1, 41–48 · with Karolina Wiśniowska
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2021
Regret averse opinion aggregation
Ergo 8, 473–495
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2021
Being realist about Bayes, and the predictive processing theory of mind
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72, 185–220 · with Matteo Colombo and Stephan Hartmann
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2018
Resolving peer disagreements through imprecise probabilities
Noûs 52, 260–278 · with Gregory Wheeler
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2015
An epistemically modest response to disagreement, AGM-ified
The Reasoner 9, 76–77
Lee Elkin · 2026 · The University of Hong Kong